How much adversarial noise can protocols for interactive communication tolerate? This question was examined by Braverman and Rao (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2014) for the case of "robust" protocols, where each party sends messages only in fixed and predetermined rounds. We consider a new class of protocols for interactive communication, which we call adaptive protocols. Such protocols adapt structurally to the noise induced by the channel in the sense that both the order of speaking, and the length of the protocol may vary depending on observed noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental questions considered by information theory is "What is the best way to encode information in order to recover from channel noise"? This question was studied most notably by Shannon in the context of one way communication, where one party wants to transmit a message "once and for all" to another. More recently, in a series of beautiful papers, Schulman [9] , [10] , [11] generalized this question to subsume interactive communication, i.e. the scenario where two remote parties perform some distributed computation by "conversing" with each another in an interactive manner, so that each subsequent message depends on all messages exchanged thus far. Surprisingly, Schulman showed that, analogous to the case of one way communication, it is indeed possible to embed any interactive protocol π within a larger protocol π so that π computes the same function as π but additionally provides the requisite error correction to tolerate noise introduced by the channel.
The noise in the channel may be stochastic, in which error occurs with some probability, or adversarial, in which the channel may be viewed as a malicious party Eve who disrupts communication by injecting errors in the worst possible way. In this work we focus on adversarial noise. Schulman [11] provided a construction that turns a protocol π with communication complexity T , to a noise-resilient π which communicates at most O(T ) symbols, and can recover from an adversarial (bit) noise rate of at most 1/240. This result was later improved by Braverman and Rao [2] , who provided * A long version of this paper appears online [1] . a protocol that can recover from a (symbol) noise rate up to 1/4 − ε and also communicates at most O(T ) symbols.
Both the above constructions (and practically the entire body of previous work, see [5] ) assume the parties are "fully synchronized": intuitively speaking, the protocols have a fixed length and a predetermined "order of communication". 1 In this class of protocols, each party knows at every time step whose turn it is to speak and whether the protocol has terminated, since these properties are fixed in advance and independent of the noise introduced by the adversary. However, one can imagine more powerful, general protocols where the end point of the protocol or the order of speaking are not predetermined but rather depend on the observed transcript, that is, on the observed noise. While Braverman and Rao show that for any non-adaptive protocol 1/4 is an upper bound on the tolerable noise rate, they explicitly leave open the question of whether adaptive protocols admit a larger amount of noise.
We address this question by considering two types of adaptive protocols that allow for greater adaptivity in the behavior of the participants. First, we allow the length of the protocol to be adaptively specified during the protocol by its participants. Next, we consider even greater adaptivity and allow the party that speaks next in the protocol to be adaptively chosen by the participants of the protocol. In both these situations, we show that increasing adaptivity allows for a dramatic increase in the noise resilience of protocols.
In a recent work, Ghaffari, Haeupler, and Sudan [7] , [6] , proposed one natural set of choices to model adaptivity, and provided efficient protocols in that model which tolerates noise rates of up to 2/7, surpassing the maximal resilience of the nonadaptive case. In this paper we make a different, but arguably just as natural, set of choices, which lead to adaptive protocols with even higher noise resilience. The main differences between the models are the following. First, the model in [7] does not permit adaptive modification of the length of the protocol, while our model does. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to consider varying length interactive protocols and their noise resilience. Second, in [7] the channel may be used to communicate only in one direction at each round (i.e., at each round, each party decides either to only talk or to only listen). In our model, on the other hand, both parties may talk at the same round without causing any collision (similar to the case of non-adaptive protocols [11] , [2] ). The adaptivity stems from the parties' ability to individually choose at each round, whether they talk or not.
A. Our results: Adaptive length
We begin by considering adaptive protocols in which the length of the protocol may vary as a function of the noise, however the order of speaking is still predetermined. Specifically, each party individually decides whether to continue participating in the protocol, or terminate and give an output. We denote the class of such protocols as M term (see formal definition in Section II).
Intuitively, changing the length of the protocol is useful for two reasons. First, the parties may realize that they still did not complete the computation, and communicate more information in order to complete the task. On the other hand, the parties may see that the noise level is so high that there is no hope to correctly complete the protocol. In this case the parties should abort the computation, since for such a high noise level, the protocol is not required to be correct anyway. The difficult part for the parties is, however, to be able to distinguish between the first case and the second one in a coordinated way and despite the adversarial noise.
If the length of the protocol is not fixed (and subsequently, its communication complexity), the noise rate must be defined with care. Generalizing the case of fixed-length protocols, we consider the ratio of corrupted symbols out of all the symbols that were communicated in that instance, and call this quantity the relative noise rate. We emphasize that both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio vary in adaptive protocols.
Our main result for this type of adaptivity is a protocol that tolerates relative noise rates of up to 1/3 (Theorem II.1). The protocol works in two steps: in the first step Alice communicates her input to Bob using some standard error correction code; in the second step Bob estimates the noise that occurred during the first step, and then he communicates his input to Alice using an error correction code with parameters that depend on his noise estimation. In general, the more noise Bob sees during the first step, the less redundant his reply to Alice would be-if there was a lot of noise during the first part, the adversary has less budget for the second part, and the code Bob uses can be weaker.
The communication complexity of our protocol above is a constant factor (where the constant depends on the channel quality) times the input lengths of Alice and Bob. However, our protocol requires the parties to communicate their inputs, even in cases where the lengths of the inputs may be very long with respect to the communication complexity of the best noiseless protocol; thus, the rate of this coding strategy (the length of the noiseless protocol divided by the length of the resilient protocol) can be vanishing when the length of the noiseless protocol tends to infinity. Nevertheless, our coding protocol serves as an important proof of concept for the strength of this model: Indeed, in the non-adaptive setting, the rate of the coding scheme has no effect on the noise resilience. For instance, an upper bound of 1/4 [2] holds for coding schemes even when their rate is vanishing! In addition to the above scheme, we show an upper (impossibility) bound of 1/2 on the tolerable noise in that model (Theorem II.2). We emphasize that previous impossibility proofs (i.e., [2] ) crucially use the fact that the protocol is non-adaptive: in non-adaptive protocols there always exists a party that speaks at most half of the symbols, whose identity is known in advance, making it a convenient target for adversarial attack. Contrarily, in adaptive protocols the party that speaks less may depend on the noise and vary throughout the protocol. We provide a new impossibility bound by devising an attack that corrupts both parties with rate 1/2, and carefully arguing that at least one of the parties must terminate before it learns the correct output.
B. Our results: Adaptive order of speaking
Next, we define the M adp model in which we allow the order of speaking to depend on the noise. Specifically, at each round each party decides whether it sends the next symbol or it keeps silent; the other side, respectively, either learns the symbol that was sent, or receives "silence". 2 We stress that silent rounds, i.e. when no message is delivered, are not counted towards the communication, or otherwise the model becomes equivalent to the M term model. We note that this type of adaptivity also implies a varying length of the protocol, e.g., in order to terminate, a party simply keeps silent and disregards any incoming communication.
Similar to the M term model, the adversary is allowed to corrupt any transmission, and we measure the noise rate as the ratio of corrupted transmissions to the communicated (nonsilent) symbols. It is important to emphasize that the adversary is not limited to only corrupting symbols, but it can also create a symbol when a party decides to keep silent, or remove a transmitted symbol leading the receiving side to believe the other side is silent. This makes a much stronger adversary 3 that may induce relative noise rates that exceed 1.
Here we construct an adaptive protocol which crucially uses both the ability to remain silent as well as the ability to vary the length of the protocol, to withstand noise rates < 2/3.
The protocol behaves quite similar to the M term protocol that achieves noise rates up to 1/3 with an additional layer of encoding that takes advantage of being able to remain silent, and provides another factor of 2 in tolerating noise. We name this new layer of code silence encoding. The idea behind this layer is that using k non-silent transmissions, one can obtain a code with distance 2k. Then, in order to cause a decoding error, the adversary must invest 1 2 (2k) + 1 corruptions, or otherwise either the correct symbol can be decoded, or the symbol becomes an erasures (which is easier to handle than an error). Note that for the special case of k = 1, two corruptions are required to cause decoding of an incorrect symbol (or otherwise, the adversary only causes an erasure). To demonstrate this idea, consider of the following simple encoding of a single bit with two rounds of communication and k = 1 non-silence transmissions: to send the bit '0' the party makes a transmission in the first round (and keeps silent in the second round); to communicate '1', the party makes a transmission during the second round (and keeps silent during the first round). Corrupting only a single round results with an ambiguous non-codeword which can be detected by the receiver (i.e., an erasure). However, in order for the receiver to decode the wrong bit value, both rounds must be corrupted. This way, while the sender is being charged for a single non-silent transmission, the adversary is charged for two rounds of corruptions.
The main drawback of the above protocol is that its length (i.e., its round complexity) may be very large with respect to the length of the optimal noiseless protocol; thus it has a vanishing rate. Next, we restrict the discussion only to adaptive protocols whose length is linear in the length of the optimal noiseless protocol (thus their rate is a positive constant and not vanishing), and show a protocol with non-vanishing rate that tolerates noise rates of up to 1/2. The protocol is based on the optimal (non-adaptive) protocol of [2] with an additional layer of silence encoding which effectively forces the adversary to "pay twice" for each error it wishes to make. This way the protocol can withstand twice the number of errors than the protocol of [2] . If we relax the model to permit the parties to share some randomness unknown to the adversary, then we can construct a protocol that withstands an optimal 1 − ε fraction of errors and also achieves a good rate. The key technique here is to adaptively repeat transmissions that were corrupted by the adversary: each symbol is sent multiple times until the other side indicates that the symbol was received correctly. However, now the adversary can corrupt this "feedback" and falsely indicate that a symbol was received correctly by the other side. To prevent such an attack we use the shared randomness to add a layer of error-detection (via the so called Blueberry code [4] ). The adversary, without knowing the randomness, has a small probability to corrupt a symbol so it passes the error-detection layer, and corrupts the sensitive "feedback" symbols with only a negligible probability.
An interesting observation is that we can apply our methods to the setting of erasure channels and obtain a protocol with linear round complexity (i.e., with a good rate) and erasure resilience of 1 − ε without the need for a shared randomness. The reason is that erasures are immediately detected by the receiver, so there is no need to add the Blueberry error-detection layer, hence, no need for a shared randomness. Our bounds for the M adp model are summarized in Table II .
II. PROTOCOLS WITH AN ADAPTIVE LENGTH
In this section, we formally define the M term model, and give more details about our bounds in this model. We defer the discussion on the M adp model to the long version of this paper [1] .
We assume Alice and Bob wish to compute some function f : X × Y → Z where Alice holds some input x ∈ X and Bob holds y ∈ Y. The sets X , Y and Z are assumed to be of finite size. We assume Alice and Bob run a protocol π = (π A , π B ), over a channel controlled by a malicious Eve. At every step of the protocol, π defines a message over some alphabet Σ of finite size (which may depend only on the targeted noise resilience) to be transmitted by each party as a function of the party's input, and the received messages so far.
In this model, each party sends symbols according to a predetermined order. Let I A , I B ⊆ N be the round indices in which Alice and Bob talk, respectively. The behavior of Alice in the protocol is as follows (Bob's behavior is symmetric):
• In a given round i ∈ I A , if Alice has not terminated, she transmits a symbol a i ∈ Σ ∪ {∅}, where Σ is the channel's alphabet and ∅ is a special symbol we call silence. • At the beginning of any round i ∈ N, Alice may decide to terminate. In that case she outputs some value, sets TER A = i and stops participating in the protocol. This is an irreversible decision. • In every round i ∈ I A where i ≥ TER A , Alice's input to the channel is the special silence symbol a i = ∅. • Eve may corrupt any symbol, including silence, transmitted by either party. Thus, she acts upon transmitted symbols via the function Ch : Σ ∪ {∅} → Σ ∪ {∅}, conditioned on the parties input, Eve's random coins and the transcript so far. Note that even after Alice has terminated, a i = ∅ is sent over the channel and still might be corrupted by Eve. For a specific instance of the protocol we define its communication complexity as the number of symbols sent by Alice (until she terminates) and by Bob (until he terminates). The noise complexity is the amount of corrupted transmissions occurred until both parties have terminated. The relative noise rate is the ratio between the latter quantity and the former. Note that the relative noise rate can exceed 1.
A. Tolerating noise rates up to 1/3
In this section we show how to use the power of adaptive termination in order to circumvent the 1/4 bound on the noise of [2] .
Theorem II.1. For any function f and any ε > 0, there exists a protocol π for f in the M term model, that withstands a noise rate of 1/3 − ε.
Proof. To prove the above theorem we provide a protocol that tolerates noise rate 1/3 − ε in the M term model.
Assume the inputs are in {0, 1} n . Alice will send her input to Bob encoded with a good error correcting code. Bob will estimate the observed error, and send its input using a varyinglength encoding. To this end, we use a family of good error correcting codes with varying output-length, ECC i : {0, 1} n → Σ cin with i = 1, . . . , i max . For any i, ECC i corrects up to 1/2 − ε fraction of errors and has rate rate 1/c i , and a constant alphabet Σ (both of which depend on ε). The redundancy of each code increases with i, i.e., c i+1 > c i , and for any x, ECC i (x) is a prefix of ECC j (x) for any j > i. This can easily be done with random linear codes, e.g., by randomly choosing a large generating matrix of size n×c imax n and encoding ECC i by using a truncated matrix using only the first c i columns.
The Protocol: For any n and ε > 0, let {ECC i } be a family of error correcting codes as described above and let j be such that c j · 4ε ≥ c 1 . Set I A = {1, . . . , c j n} and I B = {c j n + 1, c j n + 2, . . .}.
1) Alice encodes her input using ECC j , and sends the codeword over to Bob in the first c j n rounds of the protocol. 2) After c j n rounds, Bob decodes Alice's transmission to obtainx. Let t be the Hamming distance between the codeword Bob receives and ECC j (x). 3) Bob continues in an adaptive manner: a) if t < (1/2 − ε)c j n Bob encodes his input using a code ECC : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2cj n−4t , and communicates the codeword to Alice. Note that the maximal value t can get is (1/2 − ε)c j n which makes 2c j n − 4t > 4εc j n ≥ c 1 n, so a suitable code can always be found. b) otherwise, Bob aborts. 4) After completing his transmission, Bob terminates and outputs f (x, y). 5) Alice waits until round 3c j n and then decodes Bob's transmission to obtainỹ and outputs f (x,ỹ). Analysis: Suppose an instance of the protocol that outputs an incorrect value, and let us analyze the noise rate in that given failed instance. First, note that if Bob aborts at step 3b, the noise rate is clearly larger than 1/3. Next, assume Bob decodes a wrong valuex = x. Note, that the minimal distance of the code is 1 − 2ε, thus given that Bob measures Hamming distance t,
Eve must have made at least (1 − 2ε)c j n − t corruptions. The total communication in this scenario is c j n+2(c j n−2t) which yields a relative noise rate of
with a minimum of 1/3 − O(ε).
On the other hand, if Bob decodes the correct valuex = x, and measures Hamming distance t, Eve must have made t corruptions at Alice's side. To corrupt Bob's codeword, she must perform at least (1/2 − ε)(2c j n − 4t) additional corruptions, yielding a relative noise rate at least
which also obtains a minimal value of 1/3 − O(ε).
There is still a remaining subtlety of how Alice knows the right code to decode. Surely, if there is no noise, Bob's transmission is delimited by silence. However, if Eve turns the last few symbols transmitted by Bob into silence, she might cause Alice to decode with the wrong parameters. This is where we need the prefix property of the code, which keeps a truncated codeword a valid encoding of Bob's input for smaller parameters. Eve has no advantage in shortening the codeword: if Eve tries to shorten a codeword of ECC i into ECC j with j < i and then corrupt the shorter codeword, she will have to corrupt (c i − c j + (1/2 − ε)c j )n ≥ (1/2 − ε)c i n symbols, which only increases her noise rate. Similarly, if she tries to enlarge ECC i into ECC j with j > i, in order to cause Alice to decode the longer codeword incorrectly, Eve will have to perform at least (1/2 − ε)c j corruptions which is again more than needed to corrupt the original message sent by Bob.
B. Impossibility bound
Next, we show that no M term protocol tolerates a noise rate of 1/2 or more. At a high level, the attack proceeds by changing 1/2 of both Alice and Bob's messages so that whoever terminates first is completely confused about their partner's input.
Theorem II.2. There exists a function f , such that any adaptive protocol π for f in the M term setting, cannot withstand noise rate of 1/2.
Proof. Assume f is the identity function on input space {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n , and consider an adaptive protocol π that computes f . We show an attack that causes a relative noise rate of at most 1/2 and causes at least one of the parties to output the wrong value.
Fix two distinct inputs (x, y) and (x , y ). Given any input ξ out of the set {(x, y), (x , y), (x, y ), (x , y )} we can define an attack on π(ξ). The attack will change both parties' transmissions in the following way: Alice's messages will be changed to the "middle point" between what she should send given that her input is x and what she should send given that her input is x (i.e., to a string which has the same Hamming distance from what Alice sends on x and on x ). At the same time, Bob's messages are changed to the middle point between what he should send given that his input is y and what he should send given that his input is y .
Specifically, at each time step, Eve considers the next transmission of Alice on x and on x (given the transcript so far). If Alice sends the same symbol in both cases, Eve doesn't do anything. Otherwise, Eve alternates between sending a symbol from Alice's transcript on x and on x . Note that the attack is well defined even if Alice has already terminated on input x but not on x , 4 although we only use the attack until Alice aborts on one of the inputs. Corrupting Bob's transmissions is done in a similar way.
Next, consider the termination time of the attack on inputs {(x, y), (x , y), (x, y ), (x , y )}. There exists an input whose termination time is minimal. Denote this input by ξ * and assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the party that terminates first when the attack is employed on π(ξ * ). It follows that when employing the above attack on any of the other three inputs in {(x, y), (x , y), (x, y ), (x , y )}\{ξ * }, the termination time of the parties are not smaller than Alice's termination time in the instance π(ξ * ) under the same attack. Without loss of generality, assume ξ * = (x, y).
Finally note that when Alice terminates, she cannot tell whether Bob holds y or y . Indeed, up to the point she terminates, the attack on ξ * = (x, y) and the attack on (x, y ) look exactly the same from Alice's point of view. This is because Bob does not terminate before Alice (for both his inputs!), and our attack changes Bob's messages in both instances in a similar way. Thus Alice's view is identical for both Bob's inputs, and she must be wrong at least on one of them. Note that such an attack causes at most 1/2 noise in each direction up to the point where Alice terminates (there's no need to continue in the attack after that point). Thus, the total corruption rate is at most 1/2.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this work, we explore the effect of adaptivity on interactive protocols. While non-adaptive interactive protocols adapt to noise by changing the messages sent by the players, adaptive protocols allow even the structure of the protocol to change, and by this fortify their noise resilience. We focused on the case where the length of the protocol can adapt to the observed noise and showed that a noise fraction of at least 1/3 (but not more than 1/2) can be tolerated. In the long version [1] we extend the discussion to the case where the order of speaking may adapt to the observed noise. Then, a noise fraction of at least 2/3 can be tolerated. Furthermore, a higher noise resilience is achieved given additional resources such as shared randomness, or over erasure channels.
While we explore several nuances of adaptive protocols, our understanding of their power is far from complete. Our work raises several open questions and directions for further study: 1) What is the maximal tolerable noise for each model? Specifically, is it possible to tolerate a relative noise of 1 even without further assumptions (such as shared randomness)? 2) How does the noise tolerance change with the rate of the coding scheme? We show a coding scheme with a vanishing rate that tolerates noise 1/3, and previous work [2] implies one with a non-vanishing rate that tolerates 1/4 in the M term model (or respectively, 2/3 and 1/2 in the M adp model). However, we do not know if this is the maximal tolerable noise. Either a positive or a negative answer to the above question will have surprising consequences: proving such a gap here will stand in a strong contrast to the non-adaptive case, in which a tight bound of 1/4 holds even for vanishing rate schemes; on the other hand, if no such a gap exists, this means that a noise rate of 2/3 (or higher) is achievable even by a non-vanishing rate scheme!
